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CHEERS TO CENTRAL HUDSON: HOW
TRADITIONAL INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
HELPS KEEP INDEPENDENT CRAFT BEER
VIABLE
Daniel J. Croxall
ABSTRACT—Independent craft breweries contributed approximately $68
billion to the national economy last year. However, an arcane regulatory
scheme governs the alcohol industry in general and the craft beer industry
specifically, posing both obstacles and benefits to independent craft
brewers. This Essay examines regulations that arguably infringe on free
speech: namely, commercial speech regulations that prohibit alcohol
manufacturers from purchasing advertising space from retailers. Such
regulations were enacted to prohibit undue influence and anticompetitive
behavior stemming from vertical and horizontal integration in the alcohol
market. Although these regulations are necessary to prevent global
corporate brewers from dominating the craft beer market at the expense of
independent craft beer and consumer choice, evolving commercial speech
doctrine threatens to invalidate them due to a trend towards increased
protections for commercial speech. Without these regulations, and many
others like them, nothing would restrain global corporate brands from
engaging in illegal pay-to-play conduct to regain lost market share and
force independent craft beer from the shelves and tap handles.
AUTHOR—Assistant Professor of Lawyering Skills, McGeorge School of
Law; Director, Capital Lawyering Concentration. Thank you to Paige
Davidson and Jessica Gandara for powerful research assistance and
insights.
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INTRODUCTION
Independent craft beer is on a roll.1 Sales and market share are up;
popularity continues to rise. To illustrate, the independent craft beer
industry contributed $67.8 billion to the U.S. economy in 2016 and
provided more than 456,000 jobs.2 A mere four years prior, in 2012,
independent craft beer contributed $33.9 billion and 360,000 jobs.3 The
growth has been incredible. Most experts agree that the craft beer segment
will continue to grow, but perhaps not at the same pace.4 There is a fly in
the IPA, however, that could significantly curtail growth and diminish
independent craft beer’s presence in the market. Global corporate beer
For purposes of this article, “independent craft beer” means any beer manufacturer that is not
owned or controlled by a major corporation such as Ab InBev, MillerCoors, Molson Coors,
Constellation Brands, Heineken, and the like.
2 See Economic Impact, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/economicimpact-data [https://perma.cc/BH38-CCBP].
3 See Press Release, Brewers Association, Craft Brewers’ Economic Contribution Reaches $34
Billion (Dec. 13, 2013), https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-releases/craft-brewers-economiccontribution-reaches-34-billion/ [https://perma.cc/NQW3-6YT8].
4 See Keith Gribbins, 2017 Mid-Year U.S. Craft Beer Analysis: 5% Growth Shows a Slowing,
Maturing Market, CRAFT BREWING BUS. (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.craftbrewingbusiness.com/
featured/craft-beer-growth-shows-slowing-maturing-market [https://perma.cc/E395-Z2ZH].
1
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brands such as AB InBev, MillerCoors, Constellation Brands, and
Heineken (commonly referred to as “Big Beer”)5 have been losing market
share since the craft beer revolution began in the mid- to late-2000s and
would like nothing more than to recover those losses by any means
necessary.
The laws and regulations surrounding California’s craft beer industry
provide a stark example of how changes in First Amendment commercial
speech doctrine can have real, potentially unintended, consequences.
California’s craft beer industry benefits from existing commercial speech
regulations that are designed to prevent vertical and horizontal integration
in the alcoholic beverage market, as well as to ostensibly promote
temperance in California drinkers. There are several such restrictions in
California’s tied-house laws.6 These enactments are important to maintain a
competitive beer market and prohibit financial dealings that would render
the retail arm of the market beholden to the manufacturing arm.
As just one specific example, California prohibits alcoholic beverage
manufacturers from purchasing advertising space from a retailer.7 Major
breweries with interests adverse to independent craft breweries8 have hotly
contested this restriction and have directly challenged it using the

5 To provide some context, in 2016 three global corporate brewers, AB InBev, MillerCoors, and
Constellation Brands, controlled 75.6 percent of the U.S. beer market, and the five largest brewers
manufactured 83 percent of the U.S. beer market. See Major Suppliers Shipments and Share 2016 v.
2015, BEER MARKETER’S INSIGHTS, https://www.beerinsights.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=
item&id=19559:major-supplier-shipments-and-share-2016-vs-2015&tmpl=component
[https://perma.cc/J4TA-EYU7].
6 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 23001, 25500 (West 2016) (preventing, among other
restrictions, makers of alcoholic beverages from owning an interest in a retail business which sells such
beverages). Generally speaking, tied-house laws prohibit an alcoholic beverage manufacturer from
exerting any influence or control over a retailer for the purpose of preventing vertical and horizontal
integration in the alcoholic beverage industry, as well as to ostensibly promote temperance. See id.
7 See id. § 25503(h).
8 The Brewers Association is the leading industry trade group concerning independent craft beer. It
defines a craft brewery as follows: (1) “Small: Annual production of 6 million barrels of beer or less
(approximately 3 percent of U.S. annual sales). Beer production is attributed to a brewer according to
the rules of alternating proprietorships”; (2) “Independent: Less than 25 percent of the craft brewery is
owned or controlled (or equivalent economic interest) by a beverage alcohol industry member which is
not itself a craft brewer”; (3) “Traditional: A brewer that has a majority of its total beverage alcohol
volume in beers whose flavor derives from traditional or innovative brewing ingredients and their
fermentation. Flavored Malt Beverages (FMBs) are not considered beers.” See Craft Brewer Defined,
BREWERS
ASS’N,
https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/craft-brewer-defined
[https://perma.cc/E389-QZDQ]. To put this into perspective, the vast majority of craft breweries
produce less than 1,000 barrels of beer annually. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY: ALCOHOL &
TOBACCO TAX & TRADE BUREAU, NUMBER OF BREWERS BY PRODUCTION SIZE - CY 2016 (2017),
https://www.ttb.gov/statistics/production_size/2016_brew_prod_size_ttb_gov.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EJ2A-EN4D].
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commercial speech doctrine under the First Amendment.9 The Federal
Alcohol Administration Act has a similar restriction.10
That prohibition, and laws like it in other jurisdictions, are in jeopardy
and are the subject of a potential circuit split. Traditionally, commercial
speech is subject to intermediate scrutiny.11 However, since at least 2011
and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,12 commercial
speech case law has been trending towards heightened protection beyond
that provided in the traditional Central Hudson “intermediate scrutiny”
test.13 In Sorrell, the Supreme Court at the very least suggested that
commercial speech deserves the same level of protection against regulation
as noncommercial speech.14 Opponents of craft beer’s increasing market
share momentum were quick to recognize that Sorrell opened the door for a
challenge to California’s prohibition described above. And challenge they
did.15 But the Ninth Circuit recently held en banc that Sorrell did not
require a heightened level of scrutiny for commercial speech regulations
other than the already “intermediate” level of scrutiny required by Central
Hudson.16 The Fourth Circuit (and others) might not agree.17 For the
moment, however, craft brewers in the Ninth Circuit can rest safe knowing
9 See Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2016) overruled by Retail
Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Actmedia, Inc. v. Stroh,
830 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1986).
10 See 27 U.S.C. § 205(b)(4) (2000) (making it unlawful for any manufacturer or wholesaler “[t]o
induce through any of the following means, any retailer . . . by paying or crediting the retailer for any
advertising, display, or distribution service . . . .”). Indeed, federal tied-house regulations prohibit
payments to retailers for advertising in several places. See 27 C.F.R. § 6.52 (2018) (prohibiting
manufacturer and wholesaler payments for advertisements placed by a retailer); 27 C.F.R. § 6.54 (2018)
(prohibiting purchase of advertising in retailer publications); 27 C.F.R. § 6.55 (2018) (prohibiting
reimbursements to retailers for product or other displays); and 27 C.F.R. § 6.56 (2018) (prohibiting
renting display space at a retailer). Federal permits require manufacturers and wholesalers to adhere to
state and federal alcohol laws, including comprehensive trade practice regulations to ensure the
independence of alcohol retailers.
11 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
12 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
13 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; see Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Regulating Marijuana Advertising and
Marketing to Promote Public Health: Navigating the Constitutional Minefield, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018).
14 See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 563–64 (“On its face, Vermont’s law enacts content- and speaker-based
restrictions on the sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying information. . . . The statute thus
disfavors marketing, that is, speech with a particular content. More than that, the statute disfavors
specific speakers, namely pharmaceutical manufacturers.”).
15 See, e.g., Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1120–21 (C.D. Cal.
2013) (challenging California laws against vertical and horizontal integration in the beverage market).
16 Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 848 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
17 See Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc. v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291, 297–98 (4th Cir. 2013)
(recognizing that Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny is likely not the same as the heightened
scrutiny the Supreme Court contemplated in Sorrell).
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that Big Beer cannot squeeze them out of the market by simply purchasing
advertising space from retailers. The same cannot be said for independent
craft brewers in other circuits.
If commercial speech regulations are eventually held to something
stricter than Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny as the general trend
suggests, the constitutionality of many existing tied-house regulations that
impact commercial speech is in jeopardy, if not entirely predetermined.
This Essay proceeds in six parts. Part I summarizes tied-house laws
prohibiting alcohol manufacturers from purchasing advertising space from
retailers, particularly Section 25503(h) in California. Part II explains how
traditional intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech has been applied to
Section 25503(h). Part III explains that judicial momentum has been
trending towards increased protections for commercial speech since at least
2011 based on language in Sorrell. Part IV explores how the Ninth
Circuit’s recent decision in Retail Digital Network v. Prieto18 bucks the
trend and upholds Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny analysis. Part V
argues that this decision helps independent craft beer remain viable.
Finally, Part VI argues that abandoning Central Hudson for some further
heightened scrutiny will significantly injure the independent craft beer
industry.
I.

THE REGULATION AT ISSUE: ALCOHOL MANUFACTURERS CANNOT
PURCHASE ADVERTISING SPACE FROM RETAILERS

After Congress repealed Prohibition through the Twenty-First
Amendment, every state adopted and implemented some version of what
are known as “tied-house” laws.19 In their purest form, tied-house laws are
designed to prevent any ownership interests between the three tiers of
alcohol manufacture, distribution, and sale.20 Their purpose is to prevent the
pre-Prohibition evils associated with saloons that were owned or heavily
beholden, operated, and supplied by a single alcohol manufacturer with the
sole purpose of selling the most owner-produced alcohol as possible—
consumer choice and temperance be damned.21 In short, a retail outlet (a
“house”) could easily become beholden to a manufacturer and push only
that manufacturer’s products through ownership, gifts, business support,

18

861 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
See Tied House: Pillar of Alcohol Regulation, COMPLIANCE SERV. OF AM.,
http://www.csa-compliance.com/articles/tied_house-_pillar_of_alcohol_regulation
[https://perma.cc/DN66-UD5B].
20 RAYMOND B. FOSDICK & ALBERT L. SCOTT, TOWARD LIQUOR CONTROL 72–73 (1933).
21 Id.
19
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low-interest loans, and outright payments.22 And competition was fierce—
beyond fierce. Alcohol manufacturers would stop at nothing to ensure that
drinkers guzzled as much of their product as possible.23 Indeed, the phrase
“there is no free lunch” is often credited to pre-Prohibition U.S. saloons.24
Tied-houses would offer thirsty lunch crowds a “free lunch” if they
purchased beer or other alcoholic beverages during the lunch session.25
Manufacturers’ thirst for alcohol sales was truly unquenchable.
After the U.S. Congress ratified the Twenty-First Amendment,
California adopted its original Alcohol Beverage Control Act (the “Act”) in
1953, including its own version of tied-house restrictions.26 The legislature
adopted the Act for the following seemingly antiquated reasons: (1) “for
the protection of the safety, welfare, health, peace, and morals of the people
of the State”27; (2) “to eliminate the evils of unlicensed and unlawful
manufacture, selling, and disposing of alcoholic beverages”28; and (3) “to
promote temperance in the use and consumption of alcoholic beverages.”29
More specifically, the Ninth Circuit recognized that California adopted
these restrictions “(1) to prevent large-scale manufacturers and wholesalers
of alcoholic beverages from dominating local markets for their products
through vertical and horizontal integration; and (2) to promote and curb
‘excessive sales of alcoholic beverages’ by prohibiting the ‘overly
aggressive marketing techniques’ that had been characteristic of large-scale
alcoholic beverage concerns.”30
As part of the Act, California enacted Business and Professions Code
Section 25503.31 In particular, Section 25503(h) provides that no alcoholic
beverage manufacturers or their agents shall “[p]ay money or give or
furnish anything of value for the privilege of placing or painting a sign or
advertisement, or window display, on or in any premises selling alcoholic
beverages at retail.”32 It is important to note what Section 25503(h) does
not do—it does not prohibit manufacturers from advertising in retail

22

Id. at 73.
See FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 20, at 42 (1933).
24 See, e.g., Jan Whitaker, Lunch and a Beer, RESTAURANT-ING THROUGH HISTORY (Sept. 6, 2011)
https://www.restaurant-ingthroughhistory.com/2011/09/06/lunch-and-a-beer/ [https://perma.cc/Y3PMCJGF] (explaining that saloons providing free lunches is a very old custom).
25 Id.
26 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23000 (West 1953).
27 See id. § 23001.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Actmedia, Inc. v. Stroh, 830 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
31 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503 (West 1973).
32 Id. § 25503(h).
23
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outlets.33 It simply prohibits manufacturers from providing any
compensation in exchange for advertising.34
Section 25503(h) creates obvious First Amendment concerns in that it
prohibits otherwise lawful speech to some degree. Many wonder why the
state would enact such a broad restriction. The California Supreme Court
provided a general answer in 1971:
In the era when most tied-house statutes were enacted, state legislatures
confronted an inability on the part of small retailers to cope with pressures
exerted by larger manufacturing or wholesale interests. Consequently, most of
the statutes enacted during this period (1930–1940) manifested a legislative
policy of controlling large wholesalers; the statutes were drafted in
sufficiently broad terms, moreover, to insure the accomplishment of the
primary objective of the establishment of a triple-tiered system. All levels of
the alcoholic beverage industry were to remain segregated; firms operating at
one level of distribution were to remain free from involvement in, or influence
over, any other level.35

Thus, California and the various state legislatures sought to prohibit
market domination that can minimize consumer choice and lead to
intemperance. And one avenue to do so was to prohibit the influence that a
manufacturer paying for retail advertisements would have over that retailer.
“[S]ection 25503(h) is primarily designed to prevent or limit a specific evil:
the achievement of dominance or undue influence by alcoholic beverage
manufacturers and wholesalers over retail establishments.”36 Section
25503(h), however, has not gone unchallenged, and its future existence
(and the existence of similar state regulations) is all but clear.

II. THE TRADITIONAL COMMERCIAL SPEECH ANALYSIS: CENTRAL
HUDSON’S INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY APPLIED TO SECTION 25503(H)
Since the mid-1970s, commercial speech has received some
protections under the First Amendment.37 While content-based
33 Indeed, manufacturers are allowed to give retailers promotional materials for free with some
limitations. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 106 (1973).
34 Id. There are some exceptions. For example, sports stadiums and music venues. See CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 25503.26 (West 2001).
35 Cal. Beer Wholesalers Ass’n v. Alcoholic Beverage Control App. Bd., 487 P.2d 745, 748 (Cal.
1971) (citations omitted).
36 Actmedia, Inc. v. Stroh, 830 F.2d 957, 966 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
37 See Jacobs, supra note 13.
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noncommercial speech regulations must survive strict scrutiny, commercial
speech regulations—an innately content-based category of speech—must
only survive intermediate scrutiny.38 This disparity stems from a long-held
belief that commercial speech is generally of lower value than
noncommercial speech, and commercial speech regulation is more
appropriate based on the government’s power to regulate commerce.39 As a
result, commercial speech regulations are more likely to survive legal
challenges than noncommercial speech regulations.
The Supreme Court has traditionally applied a four-part analytical
framework to review commercial speech restrictions to achieve
intermediate scrutiny.40 Those four parts are as follows: (1) the speech
“must concern lawful activity and not be misleading”; (2) the government
interest must be substantial; (3) the regulation must “directly advance” the
“asserted” government interest; and (4) the regulation must not be “more
extensive than is necessary to serve” the asserted interest.41 If these four
queries are satisfied, the regulation will survive the challenge. If one is
unmet, the regulation will fail.
Actmedia, Inc. v. Stroh, a 1986 Ninth Circuit case, provides a concrete
example of Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny and involves a direct
challenge to Section 25503(h).42 In that case, the plaintiff Actmedia leased
advertising space on shopping carts and placed beer manufacturers’ ads on
those spaces.43 Coors contracted with Actmedia to advertise Coors beer on
shopping carts in certain California stores.44 The California Alcoholic
Beverage Control Board (ABC) decided that this agreement violated
Section 25503(h) and initiated an administrative action against Coors; thus,
Coors terminated its agreement with Actmedia.45 In response, Actmedia
filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory relief that (1) Coors’s conduct did not
violate Section 25503(h) and (2) Section 25503(h) violated the First
Amendment by impermissibly restricting commercial speech.46 The District
Court found for the California ABC, and Actmedia appealed to the Ninth
Circuit.47
38 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
39 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562–63.
40 Id. at 566.
41 Id.
42 830 F.2d 957, 958 (9th Cir. 1986).
43 Id.
44 Id. at 961.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 958.
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Applying Central Hudson, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.48 The court
specifically found that Section 25503(h) materially and directly advances
California’s interests in preventing market dominance because it prevents
manufacturers and wholesalers from circumventing the three-tiered system
and thus concealing illegal payments for “advertising” when in reality such
payments equate to “payoffs.”49 The court stated it as follows: “By flatly
proscribing such payments, California minimized the possibility that
alcoholic-beverage manufacturers and wholesalers will obtain undue
influence over retail establishments, resulting in increased vertical and
horizontal integration of California’s liquor industry.”50 Regarding the
fourth Central Hudson factor, which requires that the regulation must not
be more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted interest, the court
found that Section 25503(h) was as “narrowly drawn as possible to
effectuate” California’s interest in preventing illegal payoffs and, to some
extent, temperance.51 Accordingly, the court held that because Section
25503(h) “prohibits only paid advertising in retail stores, not unpaid
advertising in those stores or paid advertising anywhere else,” it survived
Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny test.52
So while Section 25503(h) survived intermediate scrutiny, it is no
easy test. And when juxtaposed with the rational basis test, Central Hudson
already employs a “heightened” form of scrutiny. But since the Supreme
Court decided Central Hudson in 1980, several opinions have cast doubt on
its efficacy and trended towards increased protections for commercial
speech.53 Perhaps none of them have caused such consternation and
speculation as the 2011 case of Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., which placed
Actmedia’s ruling in jeopardy.54

48 Id. at 965–68. The first Central Hudson factor was not at issue because there was no dispute that
the Coors advertisements concerned lawful activity. Also, the second factor was not at issue because
California has a substantial interest in exercising its Twenty-First Amendment powers and in regulating
the structure of the alcoholic beverage industry in California. Id. at 965–66.
49 Id. at 967.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 968.
53 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (holding that a statutory ban on
the advertising of liquor prices violates the First Amendment).
54 564 U.S. 552 (2011); Hunter B. Thomson, Whither Central Hudson? Commercial Speech in the
Wake of Sorrell v. IMS Health, 47 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 171, 192–99 (examining cases with
differing views of Sorrell’s change to, or lack thereof, the commercial speech doctrine).
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III. SORRELL’S TRAIL OF BREADCRUMBS
In Sorrell, the Supreme Court struck down a Vermont statute that
restricted the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records for marketing
purposes.55 There were two major issues in Sorrell. One issue was whether
the statute was a commercial “speech” regulation or whether it was
commercial regulation of a commodity or conduct.56 The Court ultimately
held that the dissemination, use, or availability of information is “speech.”57
For the second issue, the Court explored the First Amendment implications
of this type of speech regulation.58 Rather than staying within the
parameters of the Central Hudson commercial speech doctrine, the Court
discussed concerns that traditionally extend into the noncommercial speech
arena, such as whether a regulation is content-based.59 Surprisingly, and
contrary to Central Hudson, the Sorrell Court stated that “heightened
scrutiny” should be used for content-based commercial speech
restrictions.60 But all commercial speech regulations are inherently contentbased, and the traditional Central Hudson commercial speech test is an
intermediate scrutiny test.61 Despite these groundbreaking statements, the
Court did not bother to test drive or even define “heightened scrutiny” in
this context because the law at issue in Sorrell could not pass Central
Hudson’s less challenging intermediate scrutiny test as it stood.62
The Sorrell opinion contains several hints that “heightened scrutiny”
signals a departure from the traditional intermediate scrutiny test, and it
could be an omen for the end of the commercial speech doctrine

55

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011).
Id. at 567–71.
57 Id. at 570–71.
58 Id. at 563–66, 571–72.
59 Id. at 563–67.
60 Id. at 565–66. The Court at the very least suggested that the term “heightened” as used in the
opinion was either strict scrutiny or akin to it. See id. (citing cases applying strict scrutiny). The Court
specifically noted that “[t]he Court has recognized that the ‘distinction between laws burdening and
laws banning speech is but a matter of degree’ and that the ‘Government’s content-based burdens must
satisfy the same rigorous scrutiny as its content-based bans.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Playboy
Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000)). Further, “[t]he First Amendment requires heightened
scrutiny whenever the government creates ‘a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys.’” Id. at 566 (citations omitted). Of course, content-based bans typically require a
strict scrutiny analysis. Id.
61 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
62 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 571–72.
56
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altogether.63 If so, Section 25503(h) and similar laws in other jurisdictions
would likely be deemed unconstitutional.64
Sorrell does not follow the previously established commercial speech
framework under Central Hudson. The commercial speech test is entirely
distinct from any other First Amendment analysis.65 Terms like “contentbased” and “speaker-based,” commonly employed during a strict scrutiny
analysis of noncommercial speech restrictions, are not typically used in the
commercial speech test.66 Commercial speech even has its own branch of
precedent, starting with Central Hudson, which veers away from core First
Amendment case law.67 Yet, the Sorrell Court approached what should
have been a straightforward commercial speech case more like a
noncommercial speech case.
Immediately after introducing the phrase “heightened scrutiny,” the
Sorrell Court cited an unusual assortment of cases.68 First, the Court cited
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,69 a case that suggested, without precedent
or much explanation, that a content-based commercial speech restriction
might be treated differently than a content-neutral commercial speech
restriction.70 The Sorrell Court also cited Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. FCC71 to support the “heightened scrutiny” concept, but the Court’s
subsequent parenthetical described Turner as “explaining that strict
scrutiny applies to regulations reflecting ‘aversion’ to what ‘disfavored
speakers’ have to say.”72 Neither Discovery Network nor Turner defined
“heightened scrutiny”—Discovery Network applied Central Hudson

63

See Thomson, supra note 54, at 199 (“If Sorrell is to be taken seriously and its ideas applied
consistently in subsequent cases, however, then the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech cannot stand.”).
64 See infra Part VI.
65 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
66 Id. Cf. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (applying strict
scrutiny and holding that “[o]ur precedents teach these principles. Where the designed benefit of a
content-based speech restriction is to shield the sensibilities of listeners, the general rule is that the right
of expression prevails, even where no less restrictive alternative exists.”).
67 Id.; see, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183–86 (1999)
(applying the Central Hudson test to a government prohibition against radio and television
advertisements for casinos); Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475–81 (1989)
(applying the Central Hudson test to a law prohibiting commercial enterprises from operating public
university facilities).
68 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565–66 (2011).
69 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
70 Id. at 428 (considering whether to apply Central Hudson or the time, place, and manner test to a
commercial speech restriction).
71 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
72 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added).
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intermediate scrutiny73 and Turner applied an intermediate scrutiny known
as “O’Brien” scrutiny that applies to content-neutral restrictions that have
an incidental burden on speech.74 The only common theme between the two
cases appears to be a mutual concern about whether restrictions are
content- or speaker-based,75 a concern which fits more squarely into a core,
noncommercial speech analysis.
The Court continued its comprehensive First Amendment
discussion—a discussion that normally would be unnecessary in a
commercial speech case—by citing several other noncommercial speech
cases, like R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,76 Ward v. Rock Against Racism,77 and
Renton v. Playtime Theatres.78 The Central Hudson test—the bedrock of
the commercial speech doctrine—is nowhere in the Court’s initial
discussion.79 In fact, Sorrell’s first mention of commercial speech reads like
a side note: the Court states that a regulation designed solely to restrict
speech would be unconstitutional, adding, “[c]ommercial speech is no
exception.”80 Thus, at least initially, the Court effectively merged
commercial speech into a noncommercial speech analysis.
The Sorrell Court ultimately chose to apply Central Hudson because
“the outcome is the same whether a special commercial speech inquiry or a
stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied.”81 The key is the “or.” The
Court clearly referenced two different tests side-by-side, which cuts against
the theory that Central Hudson and “heightened scrutiny” are the same.
Additionally, Central Hudson is the sole, longstanding test for commercial
speech—there was no need for the Sorrell Court to reach further.
Therefore, hinting at a second test was probably not an accident, and it is
equally unlikely that the Court’s words were superfluous.
The Sorrell Court also repeatedly emphasized the high value of
commercial speech, almost as if to advocate for equal treatment between
commercial and noncommercial speech—another seeming departure from
established commercial speech doctrine. For example, the Court stated, “[a]
‘consumer’s concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be
far keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue.’”82 The Court also
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
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Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 416.
Turner, 512 U.S. at 641–42.
Turner, 512 U.S. at 642; Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 428–29.
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
491 U.S. 781 (1989).
475 U.S. 41 (1986).
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 564–66 (2011).
Id. at 566.
Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
Id. at 566 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977)).
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pointed out that in the field of medicine and public health, “information can
save lives.”83 It continued, “[t]he commercial marketplace, like other
spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and
information flourish. . . . [T]he general rule is that the speaker and the
audience, not the government, assess the value of the information
presented.”84 In glaring contrast to the dissenting opinion and the status
quo, the Sorrell Court never framed commercial speech as a lesser form of
speech; rather, the Court continually pushed the idea that commercial
speech can be just as valuable as noncommercial speech. At least by
inference, this weakens the long-held belief that commercial speech should
be less protected than noncommercial speech.
The Sorrell dissent reinforces the theory that the majority was
breaking new ground. The dissent was concerned that the majority
proposed “a standard yet stricter than Central Hudson” without any
precedent for this new test.85 Unlike the majority, the dissent expressly
concluded that commercial speech must have less protection because it
often crosses paths with commerce, the regulation of which is within the
power of the legislature, and it thus should not be inhibited by heightened
levels of scrutiny.86 The dissent also suggested that the Sorrell majority
misused words from First Amendment jurisprudence—like “contentbased,” “content-neutral,” and “speaker-based”—that do not belong in a
commercial speech analysis.87 According to the dissent, the majority
reached its conclusion “without taking full account of the regulatory
context, the nature of the speech effects, the values these First Amendment
categories seek to promote, and prior precedent.”88 The dissent’s concerns
support the idea that Sorrell hinted at a stricter standard for commercial
speech, which might—to the chagrin of the dissent—implicate the
regulation of commerce and “open[] a Pandora’s Box of First Amendment
challenges.”89

83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Id.
Id. at 579 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)).
Id. at 588 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 583–85, 589–91.
Id. at 588, 602.
Id. at 602.
Id.
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IV. A CHALLENGE TO SECTION 25503(H) POST SORRELL: THE NINTH
CIRCUIT’S RETAIL DIGITAL NETWORK TRILOGY AND UNCERTAINTY IN ITS
SISTER CIRCUITS
Given that Actmedia was the law of the Ninth Circuit since 1986 and
upheld Section 25503(h), Sorrell provided another chance to challenge
restrictions against alcohol manufacturers paying for advertising space.
One case, Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith,90 shows how Sorrell
created confusion about whether it modified the commercial speech
landscape enough to finally overturn Section 25503(h) and allow alcohol
manufacturers to purchase advertising space from retailers.91
A. The RDN District Court: Sorrell Is Nothing New
Retail Digital Network, LLC (RDN) installed liquid crystal display
advertisements and contracted with entities and individuals seeking to use
that medium to advertise in retail outlets.92 But RDN had trouble securing
contracts with alcohol manufacturers because those manufacturers were
concerned about violating California Business & Professions Code sections
25503(f), (g), and (h)93—the same statute sections upheld 29 years earlier in
Actmedia.94 To remedy this, RDN brought suit against the California
Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (ABC).95 RDN argued that Actmedia
was no longer binding because Sorrell’s intervening “heightened scrutiny”
test rendered sections 25503(f), (g), and (h) unconstitutional.96
The district court upheld Actmedia, and saved the statute yet again
because it decided that Sorrell was consistent with the Central Hudson
analysis used in Actmedia.97 The court came to this conclusion by
emphasizing Sorrell’s adherence to Central Hudson: (1) Sorrell cited cases
that apply Central Hudson; (2) the Sorrell Court itself applied Central
Hudson; (3) the Court did not define heightened scrutiny; and (4) the
Sorrell dissent considered heightened scrutiny to be a suggestion rather

90

945 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
Given the potentially huge ramifications, the craft beer industry watched this case closely and
several trade groups filed amicus briefs. See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File Amici Curiae Brief by the
California Craft Brewers Association and Brewers Association, Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto,
861 F.3d 839 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (No. 13-56069), 2016 WL 7210480, at *1–2 (supporting the district
court decision upholding Section 25503(h)).
92 Appelsmith, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 1121.
93 Id.
94 830 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1986); see supra Part II.
95 Appelsmith, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.
96 Id. at 1124.
97 Id. at 1125.
91
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than a holding.98 Finally, the court decided that even if Sorrell did establish
a new test, heightened scrutiny would not apply because Section 25503 was
not a complete speech ban.99 For all these reasons, the district court found
that Sorrell was not “clearly irreconcilable” with the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning in Actmedia.100
B. The Appeal: Sorrell Announced a New Standard
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court’s opinion.101 The appellate court held that Sorrell’s heightened
scrutiny was clearly irreconcilable with Central Hudson and remanded the
case to analyze Section 25503 with “heightened” scrutiny.102 The court also
hinted that it would be difficult for Section 25503 to survive under
Sorrell’s potentially new standard.103
In interpreting heightened scrutiny, however, the appellate court
circled back to Central Hudson.104 The court explained that “[h]eightened
judicial scrutiny may be applied using the familiar framework of the fourfactor Central Hudson test,” albeit with stricter third and fourth prongs.105
According to the court, the third prong of Central Hudson became more
demanding as applied in pre-Sorrell cases.106 And the fourth prong became
a two-part process that first considers the actual legislative purpose of the
law107 (as opposed to asserted interests or post hoc rationalizations), and

98

Id.
Id.
100 Id. at 1125–26.
101 Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638, 642 (9th Cir. 2016), overruled by
Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2017).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 653.
104 Id. at 648.
105 Id. at 648–49.
106 Id. at 648. The court stated that Sorrell’s heightened scrutiny changed the third prong of Central
Hudson; now “the government bears the burden of showing ‘that the harms it recites are real and that its
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.’” Id. at 648 (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995)). This is different than the original Central Hudson verbiage, which
required the government to show that the restriction “directly advances the government’s asserted
interest,” but RDN’s reformulation of the third prong is not from Sorrell. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). The RDN court pulls the direct quote from
Rubin, and the quote was nowhere in the Sorrell opinion. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 487.
107 Appelsmith, 810 F.3d at 648 (citing Friendly House v. Whiting, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1060–61
(D. Ariz. 2012). The court derived its new first step of the fourth prong from a district court case in
Arizona, not from Sorrell. Id. The Friendly House court, like the RDN court, believed that by saying
“drawn to achieve” an interest, the Sorrell Court was creating a fourth prong that literally looks at the
history of the law to see if it was “drawn” to achieve the interest asserted by the government. Friendly
House, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 1061 (“The fact that [the laws at issue] were created as part of a package of
99
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then considers whether the law is reasonably drawn to fit that purpose
using methods that predate Sorrell.108
Despite asserting that Sorrell justifies its version of heightened
scrutiny, the three-judge panel’s elaborate interpretation cannot be fairly
traced back to Sorrell, especially considering that the Sorrell Court said
almost nothing about heightened scrutiny. Perhaps because of these
irregularities, the Ninth Circuit stepped in to hear the case en banc.
C. The En Banc Opinion: Sorrell Is Nothing New, or Is It?
After its en banc review, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the threejudge panel.109 The Ninth Circuit decided that Sorrell did not say anything
new at all: Sorrell did not add a “content-based” threshold question,
“heightened scrutiny” is not a novel concept, and therefore Central Hudson
stands unchanged.110 Using this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s reliance on Actmedia’s holding that Section 25503 survived
Central Hudson.111 The en banc court, however, did put a chip in
Actmedia’s holding: it rejected California’s interest in temperance as a
justification for the law,112 perhaps signaling yet another challenge strategy.
Yet the Ninth Circuit’s opinion ignored Sorrell’s trail of breadcrumbs
leading to stricter scrutiny for commercial speech regulations. For example,
the court relied on Sorrell’s citation to Discovery Network, but it
overlooked the litany of noncommercial speech case references within
Sorrell.113 Also, the court believed that Sorrell stood for the proposition that
statutes . . . related to unlawful immigration also weighs against a finding that the provisions are ‘drawn
to’ address a traffic problem.”).
108 Appelsmith, 810 F.3d at 648–49. The new second step of the fourth prong does not come from
Sorrell either; this “narrowly tailored” requirement is a well-worn formulation of the fourth prong that
has been refined over time in cases like Fox. Id. at 648–69 (quoting Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)). The fourth prong required a reasonable and proportional fit to
the government’s interest long before Sorrell. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 480. Like the “new” third prong, this
part of the fourth prong is not new, and the Sorrell Court never connected it to heightened scrutiny.
109 Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 841–42 (9th Cir. 2017).
110 Id. at 846.
111 Id. at 842.
112 Id. at 841–42. The court cast a pall on any argument that temperance is a sufficient justification
to ban paid advertisements: “Even assuming that promoting temperance is a substantial interest,
Actmedia erroneously concluded that Section 25503(h) directly and materially advances that interest by
‘reducing the quantity of advertising that is seen in retail establishments selling alcoholic beverages.’”
Id. at 851 (quoting Actmedia, Inc. v. Stroh, 830 F.2d 957, 967 (9th Cir. 1986)). Moreover, “[i]f
California sincerely wanted to materially reduce the quantity of alcohol advertisements viewed by
consumers, surely it could have devised a more direct method for doing so.” Id. Accordingly, using
temperance as a justification for infringements on commercial speech appears to be fruitless going
forward. Temperance, after all, is one of the primary reasons the ABC Act exists. See CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 23001 (West 1953).
113 Prieto, 861 F.3d at 848.
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commercial speech deserves lesser protection,114 but that contradicts
Sorrell’s recognition of the high value of commercial speech. And although
the court admitted that Sorrell’s “the outcome is the same” language
suggested that the Court entertained the idea of a stricter test, the Ninth
Circuit still brushed off the possibility of separate tests.115
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit took the default escape hatch: it justified
using Central Hudson because Sorrell used Central Hudson.116 But
Sorrell’s effect on commercial speech doctrine is an open question. As
Chief Judge Thomas, RDN’s lone dissenter, wrote: “Of course, the ultimate
determination as to whether Sorrell altered the Central Hudson test is
entirely up to the Supreme Court. However, I think the most reasonable
reading of Sorrell is that it did.”117
While the Ninth Circuit seemingly resolved the issue for its own
jurisdiction, none of its sister circuits have ruled on the matter. Until the
Supreme Court speaks to whether Sorrell modified the Central Hudson
standard, commercial speech regulations like Section 25503 are in grave
danger. As a result, independent brewers are at risk in those jurisdictions.
As set forth below, Central Hudson must remain the relevant standard if
independent craft beer is to continue thriving.
D. Disagreement in the Other Circuit Courts and Potential Danger to
Regulations Prohibiting the Purchase of Advertising
The Ninth Circuit is currently the only circuit court that has ruled on
whether Sorrell created a new test for commercial speech regulations. And
even the Ninth Circuit reversed its view within a two-year period.118 Other
circuit courts have been less than clear with respect to whether Sorrell
announced a new test or whether it simply recognized that Central Hudson
already requires a “heightened” scrutiny.119 None of the circuits seem to
fully agree, and whether restrictions like Section 25503(h) will survive
legal challenges depends heavily on each circuit’s reading of Sorrell. If the
circuit agrees that Sorrell did not change Central Hudson, such restrictions
114

Id. at 849.
Id. at 848.
116 Id. at 849. (“In any event, because Sorrell applied Central Hudson, there is no need for us to
‘craft an exception to the Central Hudson standard.’”) (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S.
476, 482 n.2 (1995)).
117 Id. at 852 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 841–42 (majority opinion).
119 Compare United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 163 (2d Cir. 2012) (interpreting Sorrell as
adding an inquiry of whether the regulation was “content- and speaker-based”) with Educ. Media Co. at
Va. Tech., Inc. v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291, 297–98 (4th Cir. 2013) (differentiating heightened scrutiny
under Sorrell from intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson).
115
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will likely stand. But the converse is also true. If a circuit interprets Sorrell
to require a new, heightened scrutiny above Central Hudson’s test,
prohibitions on alcohol manufacturers from purchasing advertising space
will likely be deemed unconstitutional.
More specifically, circuit courts have sensed the significance of
Sorrell, but those courts, sans the Ninth Circuit, have struggled to
understand “heightened scrutiny” and its effect on commercial speech law.
The result is a spectrum of inconsistent interpretations.120
To illustrate, in United States v. Caronia,121 the Second Circuit
interpreted Sorrell as adding a threshold question to the Central Hudson
analysis: Is a commercial speech regulation content-based?122 Regarding
heightened scrutiny, the Caronia court stated “[t]he Court [in Sorrell] did
not decide the level of heightened scrutiny to be applied, that is, strict,
intermediate, or some other form of heightened scrutiny. Rather . . . the
Court concluded that the Vermont statute was unconstitutional even under
the lesser intermediate standard set forth in Central Hudson.”123 Thus, the
Second Circuit recognized that “heightened scrutiny” as used in Sorrell
might mean something new, but it did not explicitly recognize a new
standard.
The Eighth Circuit suggested a similar understanding in 1-800-411Pain Referral Service, LLC v. Otto.124 In that case, the Eighth Circuit noted
that the Supreme Court did not define “heightened scrutiny,” but instead of
leaving the term undefined, the Eighth Circuit decided that “[t]he upshot is
that when a court determines commercial speech restrictions are content- or
speaker-based, it should then assess their constitutionality under Central
Hudson.”125 Essentially, the Eighth Circuit appears to believe that
“heightened scrutiny” and Central Hudson are the same.
Conversely, the Fourth Circuit readily accepted that heightened
scrutiny and Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny are different—it even
suggested that heightened scrutiny might be strict scrutiny.126 Referencing
Sorrell, the Fourth Circuit stated that “the Court did not actually apply
‘heightened scrutiny,’ striking the ban under Central Hudson alone.”127 The
court continued that, like the Sorrell Court, “we need not determine

120
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whether strict scrutiny is applicable here . . . we too hold that the
challenged regulation fails under intermediate scrutiny set forth [in]
Central Hudson.”128 Thus, there is no clear, definitive ruling outside of the
Ninth Circuit regarding the viability of Central Hudson and the relationship
between heightened and strict scrutiny.
V. WHY SECTION 25503(H) MATTERS TO INDEPENDENT CRAFT BEER
So what do these constitutional standards have to do with craft beer?
The negative impact that heightened scrutiny for commercial speech
regulations would have on independent craft beer cannot be overstated.
Over the last ten years, Big Beer has consistently lost market share to
independent craft beer.129 Independent craft beer’s growth has been
exponential. To illustrate, in 2011, independent craft beer represented 5.7%
volume of the total U.S. beer market.130 In 2016, independent craft beer’s
volume share rose to 12.7%.131 Big Beer is not happy about this and is
doing everything it can to quell the losses.132 If courts subject regulations
like Section 25503(h) to a scrutiny higher than Central Hudson, they would
likely fail.133 If manufacturers are allowed to purchase advertising space
from retailers, Big Beer would receive a powerful weapon to regain its lost
market share and essentially force independent brewers off the shelves of
many retailers.134
There are several reasons why Section 25503(h) and the Central
Hudson test benefit independent craft beer and must remain in effect to
preserve its market share. But the most prominent are that (1) point-of128

Id.
See Chris Crowell, Craft Beer Market Share Hits 12 Percent of Total Beer, CRAFT BREWING
BUS. (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.craftbrewingbusiness.com/news/craft-beer-market-share-hits-12percent-of-total-beer/ [https://perma.cc/S7QS-6AZP] (“‘For the past decade, craft brewers have charged
into the market, seeing double digit growth for eight of those years,’ said Bart Watson, chief economist,
Brewers Association.”)
130 See Press Release, Brewers Ass’n, Craft Continues to Brew Growth, (Mar. 11, 2013),
https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-releases/brewers-association-craft-continues-to-brew-growth/
[https://perma.cc/V5B5-ESX3].
131 See Bart Watson & Julia Herz, National Beer Sales & Production Data, BREWERS ASS’N,
https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/national-beer-sales-production-data
[https://perma.cc/97A3-6U4G].
132 See, e.g., Kate Taylor, The Battle Between Big Beer and Craft Brewers Is Getting Ugly, BUS.
INSIDER (Feb. 11, 2016, 3:34 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/big-beer-vs-craft-beer-battle-getsugly-2016-2 [https://perma.cc/7FVH-VKJG] (discussing how large breweries have taken measures such
as mocking craft breweries in advertisements and acquiring small breweries).
133 See Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638, 651–53 (9th Cir. 2016)
overruled by Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (pointing
out several difficulties Section 25503(h) faces under a heightened scrutiny).
134 See infra Part V.A.
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purchase (POP) advertising is extremely powerful and can be manipulated
to favor Big Beer; (2) Big Beer’s prior pay-to-play market conduct, though
illegal,135 suggests that Big Beer would gladly use “advertising” payments
to squeeze independent beer from the shelves and tap handles or use those
payments to purchase favorable treatment rather than advertising; and (3)
allowing manufacturers to purchase advertising creates an untenable
environment for regulators, thus inviting corruption of the market.
A. The Power of POP Advertising
Big Beer would love nothing more than to take back its lost market
share. One way to do so is to outspend independent craft brewers with an
aim towards prominent retail placement.136 Without Section 25503(h)’s
protections and assuming that Big Beer actually paid for advertising space
(not influence), Big Beer would absolutely dominate retail sales, minimize
consumer choice, and negate the stated purposes behind state alcoholic
beverage control statutes.137 The power of POP advertising is that strong.
Several studies confirm that POP advertising has an enormous impact
on consumers. In 2016, the Path to Purchase Institute (PTPI)138 conducted
the 2016 Point of Purchase Trends Survey, in which it surveyed several
hundred consumer packaged goods (CPG) companies’ marketing
executives and their relevant data, including Johnson & Johnson Consumer,
General Mills, Hunter-Douglas, and many other household names. In
pertinent part, the data demonstrate that POP advertising increased sales by
19% for permanent displays and 23.8% for temporary displays of any given

135 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503(c) (West 1973) (prohibiting secret rebates and
concessions to retailers from suppliers); id. § 25600 (West 2018) (prohibiting free gifts, premiums,
refunds, and advertising specialties (among other things) to retailers from suppliers); CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 4, § 106 (1973).
136 The vast majority of independent craft brewers brew less than 1,000 barrels per year, whereas
Big Beer typically brews millions of barrels per year. Thus, this is truly a David versus Goliath scenario
when it comes to advertising budgets. The Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau’s figures from
2016 show that of 5,096 operating breweries in the US, 3,283 produced between 1 and 1,000 barrels of
beer. Number of Brewers by Production Size, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY: ALCOHOL & TOBACCO TAX &
TRADE BUREAU (revised Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.ttb.gov/statistics/production_size/
2016_brew_prod_size_ttb_gov.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ECV-NLX3]. To put this into further perspective,
the Brewers Association reports that in 2015, roughly “90% of the breweries in the country, more than
3,000 breweries put together, have less than half the capacity of a single MillerCoors facility in Golden,
CO.” Bart Watson, Craft Brewer Capacity, BREWERS ASS’N, (Apr. 23, 2015)
https://www.brewersassociation.org/insights/craft-brewer-capacity/ [https://perma.cc/JJ4P-CKQ7].
137 See infra Part V.B.
138 PTPI is a retail industry trade group that conducts studies and education about retail marketing.
See About Us, PATH TO PURCHASE INST., https://p2pi.org/about [https://perma.cc/T7LV-GLML].
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products.139 This is no small number, especially given that independent craft
beer only made up 12.7% of the overall U.S. beer market in 2016.140 POP
advertising’s effectiveness is not a new concept to Big Beer; indeed, this
study found that AB InBev is the third most admired merchandise and
branding in America, behind only Proctor & Gamble and Coca-Cola.141
Consider that Coca-Cola is allowed to pay for advertising in retail outlets,
and no law prevents a soda seller from selling only Coca-Cola products.
Consumers regularly find themselves in a Coca-Cola only retail outlet, but
that is precisely the core purpose of the California ABC Act—to prevent
vertical and horizontal integration in the alcohol market.142
Other studies confirm these percentages. According to a 2016 study
by the Shop! Association, 76% of all purchase decisions are made in-store
and 68% of all in-store purchases are impulse driven.143 Manufacturers
know how to manipulate these percentages through product placement,
shelf space, and plain-old marketing ingenuity. For example, Guinness
increased its U.K. sales in 2006 by 27% simply placing large replica
Guinness-filled pint glasses on the sides of shelf displays in retail outlets
and making them visible from every point in the beer aisle.144 Through
simple but effective POP advertising, Guinness retained its loyal customers
and encouraged new ones to impulsively purchase the product.145
Courts in the alcohol context have recognized that POP advertising
can greatly improve sales. Specifically, in Actmedia, the Ninth Circuit cited
to a 1977 study of “consumer purchasing tendencies” at retail outlets that
specifically focused on POP advertising and conclusions about consumer
influence concerning alcohol brands.146 That study, by the Power of
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See Bill Schober, The 2016 P-O-P Trends Survey, PATH TO PURCHASE INST., http://p2pi.org/
sites/default/files/2016_POPTrends_WP_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/SGF2-5XKC]; see also John
Quelch & Kristina Cannon-Bonventre, Better Marketing at the Point of Purchase, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Nov. 1983), http://hbr.org/1983/11/better-marketing-at-the-point-of-purchase [https://perma.cc/8TZ7LXAQ].
140 See National Beer Sales & Production Data, supra note 131.
141 Schober, supra note 139.
142 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23001 (West 1953); Actmedia, Inc. v. Stroh, 830 F.2d 957, 959
(9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
143 SHOP! ASS’N, A DISPLAY IS A TERRIBLE THING TO WASTE: EXAMINING P.O.P. COMPLIANCE
RATES & BEST PRACTICES 3 (2016), http://www.shopassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/POPCompliance_2016_ whitepaper_SM_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QC9-ADWG].
144 Nigel Hollis, Making the Most of the Moment of Truth, MILLWARD BROWN POV (July 2006),
http://www.millwardbrown.com/docs/default-source/insight-documents/points-of-view/MillwardBrown
_POV_MomentOfTruth.pdf [https://perma.cc/SF86-SNXR].
145 Id.
146 Actmedia, 830 F.2d at 961.
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Purchase Institute, and the E.I. DuPont Company, concluded that POP
advertising is indeed effective.
The study concluded that supermarket customers make 64.8% of their
decisions concerning which brand of product to purchase once they are
already in the supermarket.147 For alcoholic beverages, this percentage is
67%: 61% for beer, 74.7% for wine, and 81.2% for spirits.148 The study also
concluded that display advertising increases the number of customers
purchasing the advertised brand six times for beer, thirteen times for wine,
and thirty-nine times for hard liquor.149
Accordingly, while a substantial increase in Big Beer POP advertising
is unlikely to sway the dedicated craft beer consumer to the same extent as
an average beer drinker, it would certainly have some detrimental impact
on independent craft beer’s continued expansion and it would perhaps
recoup some of Big Beer’s losses. Most independent craft brewers cannot
afford to pay for such advertising, let alone the amounts Big Beer can
afford to spend. The result would almost certainly reduce consumer choice,
move the beer market towards integration, and make it more difficult for
independent brewers to sell their products.
B. Pay-to-Play and the Illusion of Choice
In response to its lost market share to independent craft beer, Big Beer
has engaged in an interesting two-front war to regain its losses. On one
front, Big Beer has attempted to minimize the appeal of independent craft
beer with a series of tactics and strategies aimed at discrediting the
independent craft beer movement.150 On a second front, Big Beer has
employed an “if you can’t beat ’em, join ’em” approach, purchasing
numerous former craft breweries and adding them to the Big Beer
portfolio.151 Both strategies would be emboldened if Big Beer were allowed
to purchase advertising from retailers.
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Id.
Id.
149 Id.
150
See, e.g., Paul R. La Monica, Bud Mocks Craft Beer. But It Owns Microbrews!, CNN MONEY
(Feb. 2, 2015, 2:15 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/02/02/media/budweiser-macro-beer-super-bowl/
index.html [https://perma.cc/29YG-BPJ8 ] (noting that AB InBev ran advertisements that mocked craft
beer).
151 See, e.g., Fritz Hahn, The World’s Biggest Brewing Company Is Thirsty for Your Beer-Drinking
Data, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/the-worlds-biggestbrewing-company-is-thirsty-for-your-beer-drinking-data [https://perma.cc/V95G-SF5L] (noting that AB
InBev has bought many small breweries in recent years).
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Pay-to-play conduct is illegal.152 Specifically, under California
Business and Professions Code Section 25503(c), manufacturers cannot
“[g]ive secret rebates or make any secret concessions to any licensee or the
employees or agents of any licensee, and no licensee shall request or
knowingly accept from another licensee secret rebates or secret
concessions.”153 Similarly, Section 25600(a)(1) states that “[n]o licensee
shall, directly or indirectly, give any premium, gift, or free goods in
connection with the sale or distribution of any alcoholic beverage.”154 And
the California ABC extended the definition to include any “thing of
value.”155 Most, if not all, states contain similar restrictions.156
Even though pay-to-play is illegal, Big Beer and its distributors are
not afraid to engage in such conduct. For example, the California ABC
settled a yearlong investigation of AB InBev and a distributor in 2015.157
The ABC found that AB InBev covered the cost of or partially financed
refrigeration units, television sets, and draught systems for several retailers
in Southern California.158 AB InBev settled the matter for $400,000—one
of the largest fines that the ABC has ever imposed. This sounds like a great
result.159 To put it into perspective, that $400,000 fine (enough to put most
independent breweries out of business) amounted to roughly 3% of the
profits AB InBev made in one single day at the time—$12,602,739.160 At
that price point, engaging in pay-to-play simply appears to be a cost of
doing business. In short, even though providing things of value (like
draught systems, televisions, or payments) is illegal,161 the cost is negligible

152 See Bethany Hatef, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau Announces Joint Operation
Targeting Alleged “Pay-to-Play” Activities in Florida, MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY: ALCOHOL LAW
ADVISOR (July 25, 2017), https://www.alcohollawadvisor.com/tag/pay-to-play [https://perma.cc/E58RT7V8] (“‘Pay-to-play’ is an industry term generally used to mean the provision of payments or other
‘things of value’ by an upper-tier industry member (i.e., supplier or wholesaler) to a retailer to secure
placement for the industry member’s products in the retailer’s premises.”).
153 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503(c) (West 2018).
154 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25600(a)(1) (West 2018).
155 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 106(a) (1973).
156 These statutes generally prohibit alcoholic beverage suppliers from providing retailers with
various services and items at no cost, as well as prohibiting vertical and horizontal integration of supply
and retail. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 281-42 (West 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-703 (West 1991);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-1116 (West 2017); 47 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-443 (West 2016).
157 Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, ABC Fines Two Large Beer & Wine
Wholesalers and Numerous Retailers for Unfair Business Practices (2017), https://www.abc.ca.gov/
press/PR2017-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/65S4-WGUT].
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 See Oops, They Did It Again: AB Fined for Pay-to-Play, THORN BREWING,
http://thorn.beer/oops-ab-fined-pay-play/ [https://perma.cc/5YUK-9ADJ]
161 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 106 (1973).
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to Big Beer. The obvious result is that retailers who receive such free gifts
are then obligated to push the gift giver’s product to the detriment of other
manufacturers and the consuming public at large.
This is not a regional phenomenon. Boston has long been the subject
of pay-to-play and anticompetitive scandals in the alcohol industry.162
Specifically, in May 2017, the Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverages Control
Commission charged that AB InBev gave nearly $1 million worth of illegal
incentives, including refrigeration equipment, to Boston-area retailers.163
The upshot is that pay-to-play conduct is more common than laypersons
might imagine, especially in the face of increased market share loss.164
Despite its illegality, pay-to-play happens in large and small scale across
the country.
Direct pay-to-play agreements aside, one might argue that even if Big
Beer were allowed to purchase advertising space from retailers and thus
curry favor (like shelf space and prominent placement), that should not
have an impact on independent craft breweries because the products are so
different that they are not truly in competition. That argument fails. First,
the more Big Beer can squeeze independent craft breweries out of the
shelves and tap handles, the harder it is for the independent brewer to move
product. Retailers only have so much shelf space or tap handles.
Second, Big Beer creates further confusion with its newly purchased
“craft” breweries. If a retailer wanted to sell “craft” beer but was beholden
to a Big Beer manufacturer because of anticompetitive payments or gifts,
that retailer would simply fulfill its reciprocal obligation to its Big Beer
patron by offering the patron’s “craft” beer—or at least giving it better
treatment. Otherwise, the retailer could be in breach of the agreement or
lose its lucrative patronage.
This is where POP advertising comes to the forefront as an illusion of
choice. For example, AB InBev now owns at least ten formerly
independent breweries or breweries it created to look like independent craft
breweries.165 Known internally as AB InBev’s “high-end,” these brands

162

See Adam Vaccaro, Explaining the Massachusetts Pay-to-Play Beer Scandal, BOSTON.COM
(Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.boston.com/news/business/2014/11/14/explaining-the-massachusetts-payto-play-beer-scandal [https://perma.cc/JB5Q-VH9G].
163 See Dan Adams, Bars and Packies Got Free Equipment to Push Budweiser, State Says, BOSTON
GLOBE (May 9, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/05/09/budweiser-owner-accusedstifling-competition-with-giveaways-hundreds-bars-and-stores-massachusetts/
ZK4GlD6BTUTSkpQwMuP4uN/story.html [https://perma.cc/ZF6Z-ZNJT].
164 Id.
165 See Daniel Croxall, Defining Craft Beer Is Tough, But We Should At Least Know Who Made
Whatever Is In The Glass, CRAFT BEER LAW PROF (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.craftbeerprofessor.com
/2017/04/defining-craft-beer-tough-least-know-made-whatever-glass [https://perma.cc/NE74-Y933].
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include powerhouse breweries Goose Island, Elysian, 10 Barrel Brewing,
Wicked Weed Brewing, and percentage interests of Kona Brewing and
Widmer to name a few.166 Similarly, MillerCoors owns several craft-like
breweries such as Saint Archer Brewing, Hop Valley, Blue Moon, and
Leinenkugel’s Brewery.167 Heineken owns Lagunitas, and Constellation
Brands (the company that owns Corona) owns Ballast Point.168 These
breweries are enormous compared to the average independent craft brewery
and can be found in most states.169 While exact statistics are nearly
impossible to find, reports suggest that AB InBev’s high end will produce
up to 3 million cases of “craft” beer per year in New England alone.170 And
if these breweries could legally buy influence over retailers through
advertising payments, retailers would stock on the shelves and tap handles
with these brands. Thus, many consumers would mistakenly purchase these
brands, incorrectly assuming that they are purchasing independent craft
beer. That, it seems, is precisely Big Beer’s goal.
One last problem: assuming Section 25503(h) and laws like it in the
other forty-nine states are unconstitutional and manufacturers are allowed
to pay retailers for advertising space, someone will have to examine those
advertising agreements to ensure that the compensation provided to the
retailer was truly for advertising. As noted above, California Business and
Professions Code Section 25600(a)(1) and California ABC Rule 106
prohibit a manufacturer from providing any “thing of value” to a retailer.171
Thus, if payments for advertisements are allowed, they will be an exception
to the rule. Accordingly, ABC boards will be left to police each and every
agreement. This raises several untenable issues.
As an initial matter, the California ABC consists of only twenty-two
district offices.172 Most other states have even less capacity.173 In 2017,
166

Id.
Id.
168 See Alastair Bland, Craft Beer, Brought to You by Big Beer, NPR (July 20, 2017, 12:03 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2017/07/28/539760477/craft-beer-brought-to-you-by-big-beer
[https://perma.cc/8FH6-PJBS].
169 See Bart Watson, supra note 136.
170 See Brew Studs News Serv., AB InBev Will Produce up to Three Million Cases of ‘Craft Beer’
Per Year in New England, BREW STUDS (Dec. 5, 2017), http://wearebrewstuds.com/stories/news/craftbeer-inbev-impostors-being-made-merrimack-nh [https://perma.cc/2BEZ-SZ3W].
171 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25600(a)(1) (West 2018); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 106 (1973).
172 ABC
District Offices, CAL. DEP’T OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL,
https://abc.ca.gov/distmap.html [https://perma.cc/7B9A-ZBKW].
173 See, e.g., Contact Directory, N.Y. LIQUOR AUTH.: DIV. OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL
https://www.sla.ny.gov/contact-directory [https://perma.cc/W8GE-PY76] (listing three offices in New
York); Informational Bulletin, ILL. LIQUOR CONTROL COMM’N https://www.illinois.gov/
ilcc/Pages/Home.aspx [https://perma.cc/W8GE-PY76] (listing two offices in Illinois).
167
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California had 4,657 bars and nightclubs,174 and this does not count liquor
stores, grocery stores, and other event locations where beer is sold. Absent
a major increase in funding and personnel, the California ABC is simply
not equipped to handle reviewing this magnitude of contracts to ensure
compliance. Perhaps more importantly, the ABC would be put in the
position of controlling the advertising sales market. The ABC would have
to tell retailers and manufacturers what constitutes a fair payment for
advertising and what bleeds into paying for favorable treatment. This
injection of the government into private party contracts could violate the
Constitution.175
Without restrictions on payments for advertising, states would
essentially be legalizing pay-to-play conduct. Only those manufacturers
who can afford to pay retailers will reap the rewards of superior product
placement. Statistically speaking, those products will sell more and thus put
independent brewers at a significant disadvantage. The more ominous
examples above also show that the temptation to curry favor with retailers
through advertising payments would likely lead to more than just product
placement. Indeed, as is traditionally expected in a pay-to-play relationship,
retailers would be obligated to treat their patron breweries in a favorable
manner or risk losing the extra cash flow brought in by advertising sales.
The result would be less shelf space and fewer tap handles for independent
craft breweries, and less consumer choice for the beer drinking public.
Finally, there is no entity or agency in place that is equipped to review,
analyze, and determine the “adequacy” of any payments or consideration to
retailers for advertising space. The result would be a regulatory free-for-all
with no oversight.
VI. REGULATIONS SUCH AS SECTION 25503(H) WOULD LIKELY FAIL
UNDER HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
While the Sorrell Court did not explain a heightened scrutiny test in
the commercial speech context, the three-judge panel from the Ninth
Circuit’s Retail Digital Network opinion attempted to do so by tightening

174 Bars & Nightclubs in California - US Market Research Report, IBISWORLD (Oct. 2017),
https://www.ibisworld.com/industry-trends/market-research-reports/california/accommodation-foodservices/bars-nightclubs-in-california.html [https://perma.cc/R47K-UBEJ].
175 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light, 459 U.S.
400, 411–13 (1983) (setting forth a three-part test concerning Contracts Clause interference). To
analyze whether the government has violated the Contracts Clause, courts examine whether (1) there is
“a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship”; (2) if so, whether the impairment serves a
“significant and legitimate public purpose”; and (3) whether the impairment is reasonably related to
achieving the goal. Id. (citations omitted).
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Central Hudson’s third and fourth prongs.176 Specifically, the traditional
formulation of Central Hudson’s third prong is “whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted.”177 But the three-judge
panel reformulated the prong as follows: the “Government carries the
burden of showing that the challenged regulation advances the
Government’s interest in a direct and material way.”178 Similarly, Central
Hudson’s fourth prong traditionally analyzes “whether the regulation is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”179 But the
heightened version, at least according to the three-judge panel, requires a
“fit between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish
those ends.”180 In addition, the panel expressed serious doubts as to whether
Section 25503 could satisfy these requirements on the grounds of
temperance or vertical and horizontal integration: “[W]e cannot say on the
record before us that the State’s Prohibition-era concern about advertising
payments leading to vertical and horizontal integration, and thus leading to
other social ills, remains an actual problem in need of solving.”181
Accordingly, the panel thought, based on the district court record, Section
25503(h) would fail under a heightened scrutiny.182
While Section 25503(h) ultimately survived Actmedia and the en banc
opinion in the Ninth Circuit under Central Hudson’s scrutiny, the threejudge panel’s reformulation, if adopted by other circuits, presents an
insurmountable hurdle. As an evidentiary matter, the government would be
hard-pressed to present evidence that Section 25503(h) advances its stated
goals of prohibiting vertical and horizontal integration and promoting
temperance in a material way simply because Section 25503(h) has been
the law for so long. There is no frame of reference for a market in
California without this restriction. The task would be akin to proving a
negative. Moreover, as to the fourth prong, proving the desired “fit”
between the goals and the regulation remains elusive. The proposed test
would require the government to point to evidence and facts that are not
ascertainable given that the market simply has not existed without Section
25503(h) since the pre-Prohibition era. Thus, as an evidentiary matter

176 Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638, 652–53 (9th Cir. 2016) overruled by
Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
177 Id. at 643–44 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980)).
178 Id. at 652 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
179 Id. at 643 (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.)
180 Id. at 653 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 560 (2011)).
181 Id. at 652.
182 Id. at 652–53.
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alone, Section 25503(h) and others like it (including the federal Act183)
would likely fail under a heightened scrutiny analysis.

CONCLUSION
For now, the Ninth Circuit has resolved the issue of whether Sorrell
created a scrutiny standard higher than that required by Central Hudson
with respect to commercial speech regulations.184 Thus, Section 25503(h)’s
prohibition of manufacturer payments for advertising space in retail outlets
survives. But that is not the case in every circuit. Indeed, as shown by the
Retail Digital Network trilogy, even courts in the Ninth Circuit seem
somewhat unsure of what to do with Sorrell and whether it actually created
a heightened standard. The bottom line is that Big Beer is making a push to
take back as much of the national beer market as possible through several
tactics, like purchasing “craft” breweries to further reduce consumer choice
and using illegal pay-to-play strategies with retailers. Commercial speech
regulations like Section 25503(h) help level the playing field such that
independent craft beer has a chance to compete against endlessly deep
pockets and questionable business tactics of Big Beer. Without such
commercial speech regulations, independent craft beer will certainly
shrink, perhaps disappear, and with it an enterprising industry will be
swallowed whole.
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